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Litigation and Democracy:
Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial
Stephen B. Burbank† & Stephen N. Subrin††
I. THE VANISHING TRIAL
It struck us as odd.  At some time, probably in the middle 1970s or
early 1980s, we heard that major law firms were conducting mock trials so
that their young lawyers could experience what it was like to be in a court-
room.  This was something new.  Historically, young lawyers witnessed
cases in real courts, argued motions before judges, and watched partners and
older associates try cases. Young lawyers soon tried simple cases before
judges and later with juries.  This is how they learned to be trial lawyers and
not just litigators.
At about the same time, what Professor David Shapiro described as a
“sea-change” was taking place among federal trial judges.1  Many no longer
perceived their primary tasks as deciding motions after oral argument and
presiding as neutral referees at trials.  They were encouraged to consider
themselves managers whose job was to dispose of cases expeditiously. From
that perspective trials came to seem wasteful.  As early as 1971, one federal
district court judge candidly said:  “‘[M]y goal is to settle all my cases . . .
Most of the time when I try a case I consider that I have somehow failed the
lawyers and the litigants.’” 2
This change in judicial attitude and behavior began well before 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly broadened the
managerial obligations of judges. Under amended Rule 16, judges were en-
couraged to help in “settling the case and using special procedures to assist
in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.”3
In addition, the increased use of summary judgment to terminate cases
short of trial started many years before the Supreme Court encouraged it in a
 Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin 2011
†David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
††Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
The authors thank John Burbank and Richard Marcus for comments on drafts.
1 David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16:  A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1983 (1989).
2 David Neubauer, Judicial Role and Case Management, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 223, 228
(1978–1979) (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGES (West Publ’g Co. 1971) (quoting Fred J. Cassibry, Federal District Court
Judge, Eastern District of Louisiana from 1966 to 1987)).
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I).
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trilogy of decisions in 1985 and 1986.4  Although definitive data are not
available, “[t]here probably is sufficient and sufficiently reliable evidence
. . . to believe that the rate of case termination as a result of summary judg-
ment rose substantially in federal first-instance courts as a whole in the pe-
riod from 1960 to 2000, with one plausible (and perhaps conservative) range
being from approximately 1.8 percent in 1960 to approximately 7.7 percent
in 2000.”5
Similarly, the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss complaints for failure to state
a claim early in the litigation process had become considerably more defen-
dant-friendly in many federal district courts before recent Supreme Court
cases blessed the change by effectively amending the relevant Federal Rules
under the guise of interpretation.6  Without rule change and on some occa-
sions in direct violation of Supreme Court case law,7 grants of 12(b)(6) mo-
tions had already increased in the federal trial courts, particularly in case
types that some judges disfavored.8  One early study, which for that reason
and because it is based on published opinions can hardly be regarded as
definitive,  suggests that before these recent decisions, 46% of all 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss were granted.  According to the same study, after the
recent decisions, 56% of all 12(b)(6) motions were granted, 60% in constitu-
tional civil rights cases.9  These dismissals are almost always for defendants
and occur before plaintiffs have had the opportunity for formal discovery.
In sum, the experience in both areas recalls Professor Shapiro’s memo-
rable image when discussing the amendments to the case management rule:
“At best, the argument might run, the task of rule makers is like the task of
those who lay out the walks in the Cambridge Common:   Figure out where
people go and cover up the grass with cement on those routes.”10
It thus was for good reason that major firms started to create their own
in-house moot courts and later to farm out young associates to attorney gen-
eral, legal service, and public defender offices in order to provide training in
courtroom behavior and trials.  The data are astonishing:  “When the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure became law in 1938, about 18% of civil cases in
Federal Court were resolved by trial.”11  In the early 1960s, the figure was
4 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases:  Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 620–21
(2004).
5 Id. at 617–18.
6 See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:  Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empiri-
cally?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010).
7 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
8 See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002);
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
9 See Hatamyar, supra note 6, at 556. R
10 Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1992. R
11 Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 12.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\46-2\HLC205.txt unknown Seq: 3  6-JUN-11 13:56
2011] Litigation and Democracy 401
down to about 12%; in 2002, it was below 2%.12  To some, the 60% reduc-
tion in overall trials since the mid-1980s was even “[m]ore startling.”13
II. WHY THE VANISHING TRIAL—AND SOME OF ITS CAUSES—
DIMINISH DEMOCRACY
Why does it matter?  Isn’t it a good thing to dispose of cases without
trial?  After all, over 150 years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed the advan-
tages of settlement over trial.14
If one believes in the underlying values of American democracy, these
developments are deeply troubling for a number of reasons.  Since the
founding of our country, trials in open court resulting in decisions by either a
judge or a jury have been thought to be constitutive of American democ-
racy.15  Consider what it means for there to be trials open to the public, with
the orderly presentation of evidence, oral testimony, judges explaining the
law (in jury trials), and lawyers synthesizing the law and facts in an attempt
to persuade a judge or jury of what justice requires.  Those who are accused
of a legal infraction have the right to appear in public and tell their side of
the story.  This right to be heard, the core of due process of law, has been
integral to democratic thought and institutions at least since the English
Magna Carta in the thirteenth century.  Public trials ensure that each of us
has the opportunity to see that the laws our representatives have chosen to
replace the state of nature are more than empty promises (or threats)—that
the community can and will enforce them.
Although most cases settle, some trials are essential, if only to ensure
informed settlement.  Without the realistic possibility of a trial, settlements
in large measure reflect and discount the costs of discovery and trial.  As a
result, some plaintiffs receive less than the value of their cases if tried on the
merits, while some defendants settle non-meritorious cases in order to avoid
transaction costs.  Moreover, apart from the value of litigated judgments as
guides to settlement, many legal norms need community input for the deci-
sions applying them to be accepted by that community.  Issues such as negli-
gence, intentional discrimination, material breach of contract, and unfair
competition are not facts capable of scientific demonstration.  Nor are these
issues pure questions of law.  Rather, they are concepts mixing elements of
12 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) [hereinafter Galanter,
Vanishing Trial].
13 Id. at 459.
14 Abraham Lincoln, Fragment:  Notes for a Law Lecture (July 1, 1850) in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 81 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can.  Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real
loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time.  As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior oppor-
tunity of being a good man.  There will still be business enough.”).
15 See, e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 40–68, 112–35
(2009).
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fact and law that become legitimate behavioral norms when the citizenry at
large, acting through jury representatives, decides what the community
deems acceptable.  In addition, a public trial reminds the decision maker—
judge or jury—that the lives of real human beings may be deeply affected by
the decision.  Finally, unlike confidential settlements, decisions after trial
have the potential to affect the behavior of others, which may be a primary
goal of the relevant legal norm.
With the diminution of trials generally has come the diminution of jury
trials.16  This is a tragedy.  It is unlikely that there would have been a United
States of America without the Bill of Rights, because the founders insisted
on assurances of protection for their liberties before they would ratify the
Constitution.  There would not have been an acceptable Bill of Rights with-
out a right to trial by jury.17  Distrust of concentrated authority is a central
feature of our system of government.  When all thirteen colonies became
states, they ensured the right to trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases
of consequence.18  They insisted on the same for litigation in the new federal
courts.19  Just as our federal system of many states and one federal govern-
ment and the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches are thought to dilute power by dispersing it, trial by jury
counterbalances the authority of judges.
The founders believed that twelve heads are better than one in finding
facts.20  They thought that since each juror would only decide one or a few
cases, jurors would be less jaded than professional judges.21  The inevitable
prejudice of any one person would be offset by having to consult with many
others.22  Along with voting, jury service was, and remains, one of the few
ways for ordinary citizens to participate in their own government, legitimiz-
ing decisions that resolve formal disputes in the eyes of the population at
large.  As Tocqueville observed in describing the newly created American
state, participating as jurors and witnessing trials were critical means of edu-
cating Americans about the law and giving them a stake in their courts and
country.23
16 In 1982, 4,771 of the federal civil cases that terminated were jury trials, accounting for
2.6% of all dispositions that year.  In 2002, there were 3,006 civil jury trials among the termi-
nated federal cases, accounting for 1.2% of all dispositions.  In the same twenty-year period,
however, jury trials as a percentage of all civil trials increased from 42.3% in 1982 to 65.8% in
2002.  Galanter, Vanishing Trial, supra note 12, at 462–63.
17 See BURNS, supra note 15, at 54–56. R
18 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 655–56 (1973).
19 The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution feature and protect the
right to jury trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, VII.
20 See BURNS, supra note 15, at 53–68. R
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 283–84 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Vintage Books 1999) (1835).
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Jury bashing has been a recurrent theme in the attacks on litigation that
have been waged by those seeking “tort reform” or changes in procedural
rules.  Yet, again and again, those consulting systematic empirical evidence
rather than anecdotes find that the attacks on the jury are unsupported.  Vir-
tually everyone who has studied the American jury, including judges who
preside over jury trials, find that jurors listen carefully to and follow the
judge’s instructions on the law and obey their oaths to apply the law to the
facts with impressive gravity and skill.24 Moreover, empirical studies show
that most Americans do not rush to court with every petty grievance.  Not-
withstanding occasional silly lawsuits, Americans lump most of their legiti-
mate grievances rather than litigate.25
III. RECENT PROCEDURAL ATTACKS ON DEMOCRACY
Two recent Supreme Court decisions that require more factual detail in
complaints are an implicit attack on the jury trial and, in turn, on our democ-
racy.  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,26 decided in 2007, the Court rein-
stated under Rule 12(b)(6) the dismissal of an antitrust conspiracy complaint
brought under the Sherman Act against the regional telecommunication ser-
vice providers remaining after the breakup of AT&T.  In reversing a panel of
the Second Circuit, the Court “retired”27 the language in Conley v. Gibson
that “a complaint should not be dismissed . . . unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle him
to relief.”28 Conley was a 1957 case that had been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts literally thousands of
times in the half-century after it was decided.  In addition, the Twombly
Court interpreted the system of notice pleading blessed in Conley that re-
quired plaintiffs to give fair notice to defendants so that defendants could
prepare their cases to now mean that a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”29  Dis-
regarding the plaintiffs’ direct allegations of conspiracy as inadequate to
meet this standard, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not plausi-
ble because they rested on “parallel conduct and not on any independent
allegation of actual agreement among the [defendants].”30
For a time some courts and commentators struggled to determine
Twombly’s meaning and scope of application, suggesting a number of limit-
ing criteria such as complex cases portending massive, expensive discov-
24 See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:  DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CON-
TEXT 427–37 (3d ed. 2008).
25 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:  THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 34
(2001).
26 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
27 Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 562 (majority opinion); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
29 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
30 Id. at 564.
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ery.31  The Court had expressed doubt that judicial management could
control such discovery.32  It turned out, however, that a majority of the Jus-
tices had a more radical agenda:  they were determined to change the Federal
Rules relating to pleading and motions to dismiss without following the stat-
utory process.33  In doing so, they bypassed notice and comment rulemaking
and deprived Congress of the opportunity to review, and if necessary to
block, any prospective policy choices before they became effective.34
The majority found their opportunity to change these rules in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,35  which was decided in 2009. Iqbal involved claims brought by a
citizen of Pakistan whom federal officials arrested after the 9/11 attacks and
detained in a Brooklyn federal detention center on charges of fraud in con-
nection with identification documents.  He pled guilty, leading to his re-
moval to Pakistan.  His complaint alleged that he was confined for seven
months in highly restrictive conditions and that Robert Mueller, the Director
of the F.B.I., and John Ashcroft, the Attorney General of the United States,
adopted or approved the policies and directives pursuant to which he was
confined and that those policies purposely discriminated on the basis of re-
ligion and race.36
Over the dissent of four Justices, including the author of the Court’s
opinion in Twombly and another Justice who joined that opinion, the Court in
Iqbal inconsistently treated some of the complaint’s assertions as factual al-
legations and others as conclusions.  Most notably, the Court disregarded
direct allegations of intentional discrimination, notwithstanding Federal Rule
9(b)’s explicit assurance that “‘[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other con-
ditions of a person’s mind . . . be alleged generally.’” 37  That move enabled
the Court, however breezily, to assess the plausibility of the inferential basis
for the theory of the plaintiff’s case.  Relying on “judicial experience and
common sense,”38 the Court found the complaint implausible.  Because the
Federal Rules are transsubstantive (the same rules for all types and sizes of
cases), the Court was constrained to make clear that its approach applies
across the board—that Twombly cannot be confined to antitrust cases, nor
Iqbal applied only to cases involving national security or the qualified im-
munity of government officials.39
31 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 546–48.
32 See id. at 559–60.
33 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
34 See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure,
93 JUDICATURE 109, 110, 116–17, 119–20 (2009).
35 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
36 Iqbal also alleged that other federal officials subjected him to the unconstitutional use of
excessive force, unreasonable and unnecessary strip and body-cavity searches, and denial of
medical care while he was in detention. Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting).
37 See id. at 1954 (majority opinion) (first alteration in original) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
9(b)).
38 Id. at 1950.
39 See id. at 1953; Burbank, supra note 34. R
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The Twombly and Iqbal decisions, together with the decisions of some
lower federal courts that ignored pre-Twombly precedent, can be seen as at-
tacks on American democracy in at least four ways.  First, the cases put the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in federal court (and state jury rights
in states that follow the decisions) in jeopardy.  Charles Clark, the principal
architect of the Federal Rules, was convinced that the line between facts,
evidence, and legal conclusions was impossible to draw coherently.40  Clark
argued for years against the fact pleading requirement of the nineteenth cen-
tury Field Code because it led to unproductive disputes about what was a
fact, evidence, or legal conclusion.  Consequently, the drafters of the Federal
Rules refused to put the word “fact” in the pleading rules.41
Trial judges now explicitly have enormous discretionary power to dis-
miss complaints, both through their power to excise what they find to be a
conclusive allegation and the addition of a plausibility requirement.  Since
the Court has eliminated Rule 9(b)’s permission to allege states of mind gen-
erally, and since intent must be proved in many discrimination cases, it has
become even easier than in the past for judges who disfavor such cases to
dismiss them prior to discovery.  The same is true for any lawsuit, such as
tort and antitrust cases, in which the most important evidence is in the minds
and files of defendants.  Many cases that were entitled to a jury trial—or any
trial for that matter—and that would be found meritorious after discovery,
will now be dismissed at the pleading stage.42  So much for the historic role
of juries to decide factual issues and thus check judicial power.
The second prong of this attack on democracy results from undercutting
the effectiveness of congressional statutes designed to compensate citizens
for injury or to enable private enforcement of important social norms.  For
decades, when enacting such statutes, Congress had the legitimate expecta-
tion that the Federal Rules as originally understood and long interpreted
would be applied in federal civil litigation and thus that discovery would
permit plaintiffs proceeding on the basis of a complaint stating a valid legal
theory to assemble the evidence necessary to prove illegal conduct.43  Con-
gress has frequently included in enacted statutes pro-plaintiff fee-shifting
and multiple damages provisions that encourage lawyers to serve as private
attorneys general to enforce the rights conferred.44  Professor Paul Car-
40 For Clark’s views on pleading, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law:  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,
966 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity]; Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Proce-
dural Outlook:  The Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES ED-
WARD CLARK 115, 139–43 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991).
41 Subrin, Equity, supra note 40, at 976. R
42 See Alex Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666770.
43 See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979).
44 For a comprehensive study of private enforcement of federal statutory law, see SEAN
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:  PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S.
(2010).
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rington, former Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, ex-
plained the point this way:
We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is the American
alternative to the administrative state . . . . [E]very day, hundreds
of American lawyers caution their clients that an unlawful course
of conduct will be accompanied by serious risk of exposure at the
hands of some hundreds of thousands of lawyers, each armed with
a subpoena power by which misdeeds can be uncovered.  Unless
corresponding new powers are conferred on public officers, con-
stricting discovery would diminish the disincentives for lawless
behavior across a wide spectrum of forbidden conduct.45
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, former Chair of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, also emphasized the relationship of discovery to the ability to
enforce congressional statutes:
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys-gen-
eral as an enforcing mechanism for the anti-trust laws, the securi-
ties laws, environmental laws, civil rights and more.  In the main,
the plaintiff in these suits must discover his evidence from the de-
fendant.  Calibration of discovery is calibration of the level of en-
forcement of the social policy set by Congress.46
The drafters of the original Federal Rules emphatically reduced the im-
portance of pleadings and largely left the disposition of cases to post-discov-
ery settlement, summary judgment, or trial.  To put it another way, the notice
pleading requirement and the right to discovery were intermeshed in the en-
tire Federal Rule structure.  By altering the pleading rules, the Supreme
Court has eliminated discovery for potentially meritorious cases and
thwarted presumed congressional intent.
The third and fourth prongs of this assault on our democracy stem from
the methods by which the change in pleading requirements took place.  In
some ways they are the most demonstrably undemocratic and thus the most
egregious of the attacks.  Congress granted the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through the Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, which explicitly prescribed that if those rules were to cover both
law and equity cases, they must be presented to Congress before they be-
came law.47  Since that time, Congress has mandated a number of additional
steps that must be taken before Federal Rules become law, but the reporting
45 Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997).
46 Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997).
47 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (“Such united rules
shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at
the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such session.”).
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requirement has remained.48  These steps ensure that there is notice and op-
portunity for public comment and debate—transparency and accountabil-
ity—before Federal Rules are changed.
Judge Anthony J. Scirica of the Third Circuit was, until recently, the
Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference, and for many
years he served as both a member and chair of key committees in the federal
rulemaking process.  He explained why the Enabling Act process is so vital
to our democracy as follows:
The primary responsibility of the Standing Rules Committee on
Practice and Procedure is to implement the Rules Enabling Act.
The Act was a brilliant solution to the making of procedural law.
Described as a treaty between the legislative and judicial branches,
it provides a dispassionate, neutral forum that allows procedural
law to be written in a deliberate and thoughtful manner.  Key
members of the Executive Branch (such as the Deputy Attorney
General and the Solicitor General) have seats on the Rules Com-
mittees.  The openness mandated by Congress invites public com-
ment, and new rules are enacted only after approval by the Judicial
Conference, adoption by the Supreme Court, and after a [seven]-
month interval while Congress considers whether to permit the
rules to become law.  All of this ensures the rigorous scrutiny and
public review essential to establish the credibility and legitimacy
of the rulemaking process.49
The Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal did not just interpret a few
Federal Rules.  It (1) replaced the system of notice pleading (of which broad
discovery was a part) with something close to the nineteenth-century Code
fact pleading and (2) turned a motion that was designed to deal with rare
complaints that lacked a valid legal theory into a potent weapon to dismiss
complaints that, without any discovery at all, strike judges as counterintui-
tive.  In Iqbal, the Supreme Court also eliminated, in one paragraph and with
no citation to prior case law, Federal Rule 9(b)’s clear language that
“[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may
be alleged generally.”50  This drastic change, like the unacknowledged
amendments of  Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6), substantially adds to a plain-
tiff’s pleading burden in employment discrimination and other civil rights
cases in which the intent or knowledge of the defendant is difficult or impos-
sible to substantiate without discovery.
48 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073, 2077 (2006); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Dele-
gation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1115–19
(2002).
49 Interview:  To Speak with One Clear Voice:  The Executive Committee’s Role in the
Judiciary, 41 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 10–11 (Dec. 2009) (interview with Judge Anthony J.
Scirica).
50 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
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Such changes are precisely what the Supreme Court told lower courts
could not be effected except through the Enabling Act process or by Con-
gress.51  In Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court side-stepped not only
congressional review, but the entire rulemaking process that Congress pre-
scribed, including multiple steps designed to facilitate broad public partici-
pation.  And the Supreme Court’s rule changes apply to all civil cases.52
Finally, as we have noted, before Twombly and Iqbal some lower fed-
eral courts ignored the Supreme Court’s repeated reminders about the proper
process for amending Federal Rules by requiring more rigorous pleading in a
broad ranges of cases.53  Now the Court, in Twombly and Iqbal, has rewarded
that lawlessness with its own acts of lawlessness, sidestepping the carefully
crafted and democracy-enhancing Enabling Act process.  Can it be a surprise
that we have heard repeatedly that some lower courts are ignoring Iqbal—
lawlessness cubed?
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Congress should reverse the new pleading requirements in Twombly and
Iqbal.  Bills introduced in both the Houses and Senate during the last Con-
gress would have accomplished this goal.54  The results of the November
2010 elections suggest that the passage of this legislation is now unrealistic.
Nonetheless, legislative action is warranted to avoid the potential diminution
of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury and to preserve the enacting
legislature’s expectation that laws relying on private enforcement will be en-
forced as they have been since 1938, until and unless Congress has the op-
portunity to consider some other system.  Legislative action will thwart the
Court’s stark end-run of the entire Enabling Act process.  If Congress later
finds that some issue, such as the qualified immunity defense that was at
play in Iqbal or the question of conspiracy in antitrust cases that was central
to Twombly, requires more stringent pleading requirements, this can be ad-
dressed in legislation.55  If judges, lawyers, legislators, or interest groups
think that the pleading or discovery rules should be changed for all cases,
such an amendment should go through the legislatively mandated process.
These are the ways—congressional action or the Enabling Act process—in
51 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tar-
rant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
52 See Burbank, supra note 34. R
53 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. R
54 See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. (2010); Notice
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th  Cong. (2009); Open Access to Courts Act of
2009, H.R. 4115, 111th  Cong. (2009); 156 CONG. REC. S11,037-38 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010)
(statement of Sen. Specter).
55 Similar legislation has already been passed to reform securities and prisoner litigation.
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006); Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006).
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which our democracy has long since decided to handle such controversial
questions about civil procedure and civil litigation.
There are at least three other ways in which the trend that has led to the
drastic reduction of trials may yet be reversed.  Two suggestions require that
we rethink the transsubstantive assumption of the Federal Rules.56  The third
method, changing the attitudes of attorneys and judges, may be enhanced by
the first two.
Our first proposal advocates categorical restrictions on discovery as
part of a separate set of rules for “simple” cases.  A number of states have
such separate tracks,57 as do England and Wales.58  We are not prepared to
specify all the details of such a track, an effort that should be informed by
experience in jurisdictions that already employ tracking.  We can, however,
set forth a few central features of the proposal.
We would retain notice pleading as the norm, mindful that the claim to
effective court access of those initiating simple cases is as strong as that of
those initiating complex cases.  But we share the view, which animates re-
cent reforms in England and Wales, that proportionality should be a founda-
tional principle underlying procedural rules.59  For many simple cases,
discovery of the breadth permitted by the existing Federal Rules is not pro-
portional, and its availability is an invitation to economic oppression.  More-
over, many observers of current federal practice have asserted that it is more
expensive to litigate the same case in federal court than state court.60  If true
(and we believe it is), this is in part due not just to the many opportunities
for extensive discovery but also to the multiple required steps that have been
introduced to try to obviate the need for such discovery:  mandatory disclo-
sure, discovery conferences, pretrial conferences, and lists of witnesses and
their expected testimony.  The high cost of litigation dissuades some poten-
tial litigants with meritorious claims from commencing suit and forces some
56 There is nothing sacred about the transsubstantivity assumption.  Congress has enacted
specialized procedural rules for securities and prisoner litigation, among others.  In 2009, the
Final Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Insti-
tute for the Advancement of the American Legal System supported departures from transsub-
stantive procedural rules. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 4 (2009), available at http://
www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%20Final%20Report%20Revised%204-15-09.
pdf (“The ‘one size fits all’ approach of the current federal and most state rules is useful in
many cases but rulemakers should have the flexibility to create different sets of rules for
certain types of cases so that they can be resolved more expeditiously and efficiently.”).
57 Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure:  An Essay on Ad-
justing the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 394 nn. 74–75 (2010).
58 See Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 26.1(2) (U.K.) (“There are three tracks—(a) the small
claims track; (b) the fast track; and (c) the multi-track.”).
59 See CPR 1.1(2) (U.K.) (specifying as an overriding objective that “[d]ealing with a
case justly includes . . . dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate—(i) to the
amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the
issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party”).
60 See Subrin, supra note 57, at 389–90 n.56. R
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of those who do sue, and some defendants, into settlements that do not truly
reflect the merits.
Less discovery for simple cases thus does not mean second-class justice
for those cases. Rather, by reducing the breadth of discovery, we effectively
reduce transaction costs and force lawyers to focus on the heart of the dis-
pute.  This and other features of the simple case track we advocate should
enhance the realistic prospects of a trial and thus the possibility that settle-
ments will do justice to the parties—in short, that the law will actually be
enforced.
The rule makers have appeared to heed, even if faint-heartedly, the les-
sons of empirical studies that suggest the value of bright-line rules.  In a
series of amendments, they have introduced presumptive limits on the num-
ber of interrogatories and depositions and on the length of depositions.61  We
say “faint-heartedly” because such limits can be avoided by stipulation and
court order.62  Moreover, the limits are so high (i.e., ten depositions per side)
that they are either irrelevant or an invitation to economic oppression in
many lawsuits.  This suggests to us that, in addition to tolerating very little
pretrial case management and mandating virtually unchangeable discovery
and trial schedules, the rules for a simple case track should include non-
negotiable limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions and on the
length of depositions.  Dispensation from these rules should be available
only by court order to prevent manifest injustice (or some similarly daunting
standard).  Some of those numbers might vary within the simple case track
depending on whether the case is subject to mandatory disclosure.
The rule makers have not attempted any limit on document discovery
presumably because they could not come up with any limiting principles that
did not seem insupportably arbitrary.  We acknowledge that document dis-
covery is the hardest nut to crack.  Progress should be possible, however, so
long as we are guided by the proportionality principle, have the comfort of
knowing that “simple” cases do not include those implicating the private
enforcement of federal statutory norms (see below), and remember that
broad discovery can be an instrument of economic oppression and a perverse
incentive for lawyers billing by the hour.  Document discovery under the
Federal Rules required court approval (for good cause shown) prior to
1970.63  In other common law countries that require disclosure or permit
discovery of documents, but generally do not view private litigation as an
enforcement tool, “the scope of discovery or disclosure is specified and lim-
61 For the current rules reflecting these amendments, see FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2) (pre-
sumptive limit of ten depositions per side); id. R. 30(d)(1) (presumptive limit of  deposition’s
duration to “1 day of 7 hours”); id. at R. 33(a)(1) (presumptive limit of twenty-five written
interrogatories).
62 See id. at R. 30(a)(2); 30(d)(1); 33(a)(1).
63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1948) (amended 1970) (eliminating good cause requirement).
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ited.”64  Precedent for requiring such specificity exists in this country in
cases permitting direct discovery from abroad.65
From a narrow efficiency perspective, a rule requiring that document
requests in simple track cases be specific may help to solve the problem of
the cost of searching for responsive documents, but it may not be adequate
for that purpose.  One additional area that might be explored, but that we do
not now advocate, is a time window keyed to an objective characteristic of
the litigation (such as a designated number of years from the date when the
allegedly harm-producing conduct took place).  In addition, since the search
costs in question may be most burdensome for electronic documents (partic-
ularly e-mail), unlike the Court in Twombly, which relied heavily on a
twenty-year-old theoretical article on discovery that antedated three sets of
amendments to the discovery rules,66 we would acknowledge the e-discovery
amendments recently made and seek empirical evidence concerning their
effectiveness.
Objections often made to tracking proposals include the difficulty of
drawing the lines necessary to sort cases into tracks and the likelihood of
costly satellite litigation over decisions made.  The answer to the latter, we
believe, is to provide sufficiently objective and determinate criteria for the
initial decision and not to permit any appeal.  In addition, we would give
exclusive responsibility for case assignment to federal judges who are dedi-
cated (in part) to the task.  Because there would be no appeal, magistrate
judges probably could not be used for this purpose, but district judges serv-
ing in senior status might be ideal.
The task of defining “simple” cases is, to be sure, not simple.  As indi-
cated above, however, we conclude that cases implicating the private en-
forcement of public law should not be included because, among other things,
broader discovery than that available in the simple case track may be neces-
sary for adequate enforcement.  Fortunately, some objective criteria for im-
plementing this exclusion from the simple case track are to be found in
statutory provisions for multiple damages and one-way pro-plaintiff fee-
shifting.  For more than a century Congress has used both of these kinds of
provisions to promote private enforcement of federal statutes.67  Assuming
that private enforcement cases are protected, it may be sufficient to define
the rest of the landscape in terms of the amount in controversy.  Any such
amount—for instance, cases involving less than $500,000 are assigned to the
64 RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, in PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE 100, 131 (2006). See id. at 130 (Rule 22.1.1) (“Documents and other records of
information that are specifically identified or identified within specifically defined catego-
ries”).  Note, moreover, that in England and Wales, document disclosure does not apply to the
small claims track, see CPR 31.1(2) (U.K.), and may be limited in cases on the fast track. See
CPR 28.3, 31.5 (U.K.).
65 See, e.g., Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987).
66 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 560 n.6 (2007) (citing Frank
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989)).
67 See FARHANG, supra note 44, at 63–64. R
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simple case track—is arbitrary, but the line must be drawn somewhere.  In
order to prevent costly satellite litigation, the judge with responsibility for
case assignment should have unreviewable discretion to determine whether
the case as pleaded realistically exceeds the limit.
Congressional action will probably be necessary to overcome the tradi-
tional judicial hostility to a simple case track.  Creation of such a track
would almost certainly lead to more litigation in federal court—the so-called
highway effect.  Congress should ensure that the federal judiciary has re-
sources that are adequate to the task, with “adequate” defined in a fashion
that honors the best traditions of the federal courts rather than the bare
minimum.
The creation of a separate track for simple cases would not address
problems in complex cases of the sort that supposedly prevented the Court in
Twombly from following precedent on pleading and relying on judicial man-
agement of the discovery process to ensure that discovery costs did not get
out of control.  The Court, however, ignored the discovery amendments after
1989 (the date of the theoretical article on which it chiefly relied),68 most
importantly the 2006 e-discovery amendments.69  We would insist on empiri-
cal evaluation of the effectiveness of those amendments.
Our second proposal again abandons transsubstantive procedure, which
is usually expressed in flexible, non-confining language designed to accom-
modate high-stakes, complex cases.  We would encourage (or ask Congress
to require) the rule makers to work with the bar to develop discovery proto-
cols for the types of litigation thought (or, preferably, found in empirical
studies) to impose the most burdensome discovery costs.  The protocols
would permit lawyers to inform their clients about what to expect in certain
case types and would permit judges to compel or adjust the limitations in the
protocol as necessary or appropriate for a particular case.70  We do not be-
lieve that such an enterprise would be inconsistent with the Enabling Act,
and even if it were, the Act could be amended, or the rule makers could
propose protocols for adoption by Congress.
We turn finally to an area of reform that lies close to the heart of our
concerns:  summary judgment.  This reform area forces one to look into the
minds and hearts—the attitudes—of judges and lawyers.  There is nothing
obviously wrong with the governing Federal Rule 56, which attempts to
identify those cases in which, after adequate time for discovery, a trial would
be a waste of time and money and an invitation to irrational jury behavior.
68 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. R
69 See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV.
321, 332 (2008) (discussing the 2006 e-discovery amendments).
70 Prompted by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, plaintiff and defendant employ-
ment discrimination lawyers are currently working on discovery protocols for employment
discrimination cases. See Memorandum re: Preliminary Report on Pattern Discovery Requests
in Employment Cases Project, Oct. 20, 2010, in Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Meeting,
Nov. 15–16, 2010, 579–93, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2010-11.pdf.
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Put otherwise, it is not clear how, at least on a transsubstantive basis, one
could fashion a replacement that would prevent the mischief of ad hoc judg-
ments that often appear arbitrary because of the amorphous nature of what
constitutes an evidentiary foundation sufficient to support a jury finding.
That mischief, confirmed by empirical study, consists of a supposedly uni-
form rule in fact operating in radically different fashion in different parts of
the country and in different categories of cases,71 coupled with evidence that
in some cases the actual application of the rule has unfairly deprived liti-
gants (usually plaintiffs) of a trial by jury or a trial in open court.72
Rules probably cannot restore summary judgment to its proper role in
civil litigation, and they cannot restore trial in open court, jury trial, and
respect for statutory norms and legislative policy to their historic, honored
positions in American law.  We need widespread change in attitudes.
If federal judges were given the resources necessary to do their jobs,
aggressive deployment of trial-aborting procedural devices could no longer
be justified by docket pressures and trials could no longer be regarded as
failures.  When everyone recognizes that procedure is power, invocations of
“adjective law”73 would no longer shield judges from criticism, including
criticism in Congress, for privileging their personal policy preferences.  That
alone should help to induce greater judicial humility.
It would be better, however, if judges acknowledged the fragility of
those preferences, which are often mere hunches uninformed by systematic
empirical evidence and vulnerable to cultural biases.74  Long ago, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo famously put it this way:
Of the power of favor or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil
sense I have found no trace, not even the faintest among judges I
have known.  But every day there is borne in on me a new convic-
tion of the inescapable relation between the truth without us and
the truth within.  The spirit of the age, as revealed in each of us, is
too often only the spirit of the group in which accidents of birth or
education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place.  No
effort or revolution of mind will overthrow utterly or at all times
the empire of these subconscious loyalties.75
Before condemning a case to summary disposition on the basis of “ju-
dicial experience and common sense,” judges should heed the observation of
the late, great Judge Richard Arnold:  “Although you pick up a file and say,
71 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 618. R
72 See id. at 622.
73 See Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords:  A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment
on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 662 (1985) (“Law reformers have long assured us that
procedure is technical, details—in short, adjective law.”).
74 See generally Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are
You Going to Believe?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 838 (2009).
75 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174–75 (1921).
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‘Well, there is a ninety-eight percent chance that this is frivolous,’ that does
not mean you read only two percent of the file.”76  Where the right to trial by
jury is in question, judges should also heed Professor Burns’ caution that
“[p]aradoxically, by giving particularity and empirical truth their due, the
trial provides a strong critique of commonsense generalizations . . . . The
trial provides a self-criticism of the overgeneralized ‘scripts’ within which
much of our common sense is stored.”77
If trials became an economically realistic option in substantially more
cases, lawyers could no longer hide behind settlement, and law schools
would once again know that they were training students for the world as it is
rather than as it was.  Jury service, and the opportunity for direct participa-
tion in the democratic enterprise it provides, would be available to a larger
number of citizens.  If trials became an economically realistic option in sub-
stantially more cases, private law enforcement would be enhanced.
Civil litigation and democracy should be, and they can be, mutually
reinforcing.  The current state of destructive friction between them is a prod-
uct of inadequate resources, the triumph of institutional and professional
self-interest, and both legislative and judicial politics.  Our citizens deserve
better.  The aspirations of our founders for trials in open court and jury trials
are not obsolete, and neither is the duty of the judiciary, within constitutional
limits, to respect clearly articulated statutory norms and clearly articulated
legislative policy.
Maybe both of us have spent too long in ivory towers, giving us the
luxury to dream.  But is it too much to hope that in the not-too-distant future
firms will no longer find it necessary to introduce their young lawyers to the
courtroom through mock trials and that judges will enthusiastically embrace
the notion “that the word ‘judge’ is a verb as well as a noun?”78
76 Richard S. Arnold, Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the Other Two
Branches, Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 34 (1996).
77 BURNS, supra note 15, at 35. R
78 Harp v. Citty, 161 F.R.D. 398, 402 (E.D. Ark. 1995).
